A structural dysfunction, not just an individual one
In startups and fast-growing SMEs, the management model often relies on hybrid, informal delegation. Senior leadership focuses on financial trade-offs, high-level business development, or fundraising, while day-to-day operational management is handed to middle managers.
This setup creates a systemic vulnerability: the invisibility of the actual output produced by the people doing the work. When analysis, a strategic deck, or a project framework is produced at the operational level and then filtered through a middle layer before reaching leadership, the risk of abusive appropriation - credit stealing - becomes critical.
LMX theory: why some employees become invisible
Leader-Member Exchange theory (Dansereau, Graen & Haga, 1975) shows that leaders don't maintain a uniform relationship with every employee: they develop differentiated dyadic relationships, often splitting the team into two groups.
In-Group
A high-trust relationship: frequent informal exchanges, direct access to the leader, perceived autonomy. Usually occupied by the middle manager.
Out-Group
A transactional, formalized relationship: communication runs through intermediaries. Often the position left to the person doing the actual work.
The middle manager, as an In-Group member, has a direct communication channel with leadership. They can use it to present deliverables as the product of their own steering - "we built...", "I'm putting the presentation together with..." - reducing the Out-Group contributor to an invisible resource.
Agency theory: information asymmetry as the mechanism
Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) models the relationship between a Principal, who delegates, and an Agent, who executes. Information asymmetry is its central flaw:
Information asymmetry = Information held (Agent) − Information perceived (Principal)
Two concrete mechanisms follow. Strategic information retention: the agent filters document flow or withholds logistical access (meeting invitations, video call links) to prevent the operational contributor from interacting directly with the Principal. And moral hazard: since leadership cannot verify in real time the true origin of each document, the agent claims the intellectual wins to consolidate their internal standing.
Three tactics of invisibilization
| Tactic | Mechanism | Impact on the contributor | Impact on the organization |
|---|---|---|---|
| Direct credit stealing | The raw work is reused as-is in emails or presentations signed by the manager. | Loss of self-efficacy, isolation, demotivation. | An incompetent profile gets promoted; decisions rest on false expertise. |
| Access gatekeeping | Intentional omission from invitations to strategic meetings. | Disconnection from the project's broader stakes. | Loss of direct alignment between the person who designed the work and the client or leadership. |
| Zones of uncertainty (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977) | Refusal to share input data, citing incompleteness. | Operational paralysis, extra research overhead. | Duplicated effort, lower overall productivity. |
Three traceability levers to protect yourself
- Mark every deliverable indelibly. Export strategic documents in a non-editable format, with an explicit author credit on the cover page and in the footer.
- Systematically formalize by joint email. Send the finished deliverable with leadership in copy, using factual, dated wording.
- Keep a consolidated alignment record. Regularly match delivered work against the original role objectives, so you have factual proof of authorship.
These three levers share one thing in common: they rely on traceability. That's structurally what a shared workspace provides when every task keeps a record of who created it, edited it, and delivered it, with a timestamped history visible to the whole team - not just the middle layer. A project management tool built for transparency mechanically shrinks the zones of uncertainty these dynamics exploit.
Sources
- Crozier, M., & Friedberg, E. (1977). L'acteur et le système : Les contraintes de l'action collective. Éditions du Seuil.
- Dansereau, F., Graen, G., & Haga, W. J. (1975). A vertical dyad linkage approach to leadership within formal organizations: A longitudinal investigation of the role making process. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 13(1), 46-78.
- Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
- Weber, M. (1921). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Economy and Society). Mohr Siebeck.